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Device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) provides the strongest form of secure
key exchange, using only the input-output statistics of the devices to obtain information-theoretic
security. Although the security principles of DI-QKD are now well-understood, it remains a technical
challenge to derive reliable security bounds for generic DI-QKD protocols beyond the standard ones.
In this Letter, we present a numerical framework based on semidefinite programming that provides
reliable lower bounds on the asymptotic secret key rate of any QKD protocol with untrusted devices.
In particular, our method can be applied to obtain secret key rates from any Bell inequality.
INTRODUCTION
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-
QKD) is the art of exchanging secret keys using devices
which are untrusted or imperfect [1, 2]. In this frame-
work, security is based solely on the observation of non-
local correlations—therefore, it is not necessary to know
precisely how the devices behave during the protocol ex-
ecution. Indeed, sufficiently strong violation of some Bell
inequalities [3] indicates that the devices possess strong
entanglement [4–8], an ingredient which is essential for se-
cure key distribution [9, 10]. For this reason, DI-QKD—
besides its foundational significance—also has a practical
appeal: it may lead to QKD protocols which are highly
resistant against implementation loopholes [11].
While the concept of DI-QKD can be easily appreci-
ated from the unique monogamy property of non-local
correlations [12], a formal security analysis can be in-
volved and tricky. This is because the dimension of the
underlying shared quantum state is unknown and many
existing security proof techniques only apply to qubit-
level systems. In this Letter, we present a numerical tool-
box to address this difficulty, computing reliable lower
bounds on the secret key rate of DI-QKD.
Recently, similar toolboxes [13–15] were proposed for
standard QKD, which is device-dependent (DD). Our ap-
proach covers a wider range of scenarios, adapting to dif-
ferent levels of device characterization (see Fig. 1). At
present, to prove the security of DI-QKD, the existing
approaches are either to show that it is sufficient to con-
sider Bell-diagonal qubit-level systems and then directly
compute the Holevo quantity between the adversary and
the key [1], or to use the Navascués-Pironio-Acín (NPA)
hierarchy [16] to bound the adversary’s guessing proba-
bility [17, 18]. However, neither of these approaches is
truly satisfactory: the former is currently limited to DI-
QKD protocols based on specific Bell inequalities with
binary inputs and outputs, while the latter only yields
bounds on the min-entropy, which is a potentially overly
FIG. 1. Classes of assumptions: Under device-dependent
(DD) assumptions, all measurements and their underlying
local Hilbert spaces are characterized. Under fully device-
independent (DI) assumptions, none of these are known, and
we only assume the validity of quantum mechanics. Semi-
device-independent (sDI) assumptions lie between these two
cases, by having partial characterizations of the measure-
ments. In this work, we focus on sDI scenarios where one
party’s measurements are fully characterized while the other’s
are unknown [19, 20].
pessimistic lower bound on the von Neumann entropy (re-
cently shown [2] to be the relevant quantity for evaluating
the secret key rate against general sequential attacks). In
short, the existing approaches are either too restrictive or
may lead to suboptimal key rates. Our toolbox is more
generally applicable and bounds the von Neumann en-
tropy directly, using the full outcome distribution from
a DI-QKD setup (in particular, it can be applied to any
Bell inequality for that setup).
The main mechanism of our toolbox is a new method
for estimating the entropy production of a quantum chan-
nel on an unknown state under algebraic constraints. The
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2full details of this are described in a separate publica-
tion [21]. Here, we focus on its application to DI-QKD.
Conceptually, our method enables us to estimate this en-
tropy production via a polynomial optimization on the
free *-algebra generated by all measurement operators
involved in a specific protocol. Using this approach, we
can then algebraically capture the problem of optimizing
over all measurements and states of unknown dimension.
Consequently, this gives rise to bounds which can be com-
puted as SDPs, via the NPA hierarchy [16]. Using this
framework, adding more assumptions on an implemen-
tation (like switching from DI to sDI or DD scenarios)
corresponds to a more specific description of the corre-
sponding *-algebra; this translates into more constraints
on the SDPs and hence tighter bounds on the resulting
key rates.
SETTING AND METHODS
FIG. 2. Basic situation: By measuring her share of the joint
state ψABE with a measurement A0, Alice is (virtually) send-
ing a raw key to Bob who (virtually) receives it by measuring
B0. Bob’s uncertainty on his received key is quantified by the
classical conditional entropy H(A0|B0). Meanwhile Eve has
access to all classical communication and her share of the joint
quantum state, which gives her some partial information on
A0 as well. This is quantified by the classical-quantum con-
ditional entropy H(A0|E).
To assess the performance of some QKD protocol, one
can start by finding the asymptotic key rate r∞ under the
assumption of independent and identically distributed
(IID) states. This is a first estimate of what might be
achieved after accounting for finite-size and non-IID ef-
fects.
In this setting, we consider QKD protocols that can be
modelled as follows: in each round, Alice and Bob share
a quantum state ρAB , and Eve’s side-information E is
described by the purification ψABE of ρAB (see Fig. 2).
Intuitively, this means that she has full control of all parts
of the quantum system that are not in the labs of Alice
and Bob. In each round, Alice performs one measurement
from a set {A0, A1, . . . AX−1} on the local system in her
possession, and similarly Bob performs a measurement
from {B0, B1, . . . , BY−1}. The raw key will be produced
from the measurements (A0, B0). This picture is an es-
sential part of entanglement-based protocols, but can also
be used to prove security in the prepare-and-measure set-
ting using the technique described in [22, 23]. In this
work, we restrict our discussion to protocols that use one-
way error correction. Devetak and Winter proved [24]
that the asymptotic key rate for such protocols is given
by the intuitive formula
r∞ = H(A0|E)−H(A0|B0), (1)
which can be qualitatively interpreted as the difference
between Eve’s and Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s key-
generating measurement A0.
The H(A0|B0) term in Eq. (1) can be computed based
on the expected behaviour of the devices (see [2] for de-
tails), so the main challenge is to bound H(A0|E) based
on the statistics observed from the various measurements.
Specifically, suppose the protocol involves estimating pa-
rameters of the form lj =
∑
abxy c
(j)
abxyPr(ab|xy) for some
coefficients c(j)abxy, where Pr(ab|xy) is the probability of
outcome (a, b) from measurements (Ax, By). (For in-
stance, these parameters could be Bell inequalities in a
DI scenario.) Let Pa|x denote the projector [25] corre-
sponding to outcome a of Alice’s measurement Ax, and
analogously, let Pb|y denote Bob’s measurement projec-
tors. The task is then to find lower bounds on
inf H(A0|E)
s.t. 〈Lj〉ψABE = lj ,
(2)
where Lj =
∑
abxy c
(j)
abxyPa|x ⊗ Pb|y, and the infimum
takes place over ψABE and any uncharacterized measure-
ments (which may be some or all of the measurements,
for sDI and DI scenarios respectively). For the unchar-
acterized measurements, even their dimensions may not
be known. The focus of our work is a method to tackle
this task despite this difficulty [26], and we present this
result later as Theorem 1.
To instead prove security of finite-length protocols
against general attacks, one could in principle use ap-
proaches based on de Finetti theorems [27, 28] to re-
duce the analysis of many DD protocols to the IID case.
Those approaches do not easily generalise to DI proto-
cols, but the recently developed entropy accumulation
theorem [2, 29] shows that even for DI protocols, the
key rate against general sequential attacks is still of a
form essentially similar to Eq. (1). The theorem greatly
simplifies the analysis of such scenarios, because it in-
herently accounts for finite-size and non-IID effects, and
reduces the main challenge in a security proof to a task
similar to the IID case—namely, bounding H(A0|E) sub-
ject to constraints of the form 〈LJ〉 = lj (see [2, 29, 30]
for details). Our approach can hence also be used to
compute finite key lengths against general sequential at-
tacks, by applying the entropy accumulation theorem to
our results.
3Eve’s side-information as entropy production on ρAB
The advantage of quantum over classical cryptogra-
phy stems from the fact that for a quantum system it
is possible to bound Eve’s knowledge, given only access
to the Alice-Bob subsystem. To make this precise for
H(A0|E), we regard the key-generating measurement as
a quantum-to-classical channel that maps Alice’s (quan-
tum) system A to a memory register A0 that stores the
(classical) measurement outcomes. By Stinepring’s theo-
rem [31], we can describe the action of this channel with
an isometry V to an expanded system A0A′. This isom-
etry maps our initial global pure state ΨABE to a pure
final state ΨA′BEA0 (see Fig. 3).
Since the entropies of the two sides of a bipartite pure
state are equal, we have
H(E) = H(AB) and H(A0E) = H(A′B), (3)
and hence we can write
H(A0|E) = H(A0E)−H(E)
= H(A′B)−H(AB)
= H(T [ρAB ])−H(ρAB) =: ∆H, (4)
where T [ρAB ] = trA0((V ⊗ IB)ρAB(V ⊗ IB)†). At this
point, it is important to notice that the last line of Eq. (4)
only depends on the reduced state on the Alice-Bob sys-
tem. Hence Alice and Bob can estimate Eve’s knowledge
by only observing quantities involving their own systems.
Furthermore, the last line of Eq. (4) can be interpreted as
entropy production ∆H resulting from the transforma-
tion AB → A′B. For projective measurements, a short
computation [15, 21] shows we can choose V such that T
is the pinching channel
T [ρAB ] =
∑
a
(Pa|0 ⊗ IB)ρAB(Pa|0 ⊗ IB). (5)
Bounding the entropy production
Besides its application to QKD as outlined above, the
amount of entropy that is produced or consumed by a
quantum operation T is one of the central quantities that
allows us to describe many other relevant properties of
a physical system. This will be elaborated on in greater
detail in a second publication [21]. Nonetheless, finding
such a change of entropy in practice is not a straightfor-
ward task, since the von Neumann entropy of a quantum
state is not a directly accessible quantity. Instead, the
quantities that are directly accessible are typically the
expectation values of certain observables, i.e. expressions
of the form 〈Lj〉ρ = tr(ρLj) for operators Lj (which in
QKD scenarios have the form described earlier). Follow-
ing this perspective, we have to study [21] the following
FIG. 3. Connection to entropy production: The key-
generating measurement is regarded as an isometry to a larger
Hilbert space, by expanding the classical memory A0 with an
ancillary system A′. From this perspective the global state
before and after the measurement is pure, and thus the en-
tropy change ∆H on the memory-Eve subsystem equals the
entropy change on the Alice-Bob subsystem. This allows us
to bound H(A0|E) by characterizing only the Alice-Bob sub-
system, i.e. without accessing Eve’s subsystem.
problem: find bounds on ∆H that hold for all states
consistent with observed constraints 〈Lj〉ρ = lj . For the
purposes of QKD, these bounds have to be lower bounds,
since we want to consider a worst-case scenario for the
action of Eve.
To tackle this task, we propose the following ansatz:
for coefficients λj ∈ R, we define L =
∑
j λjLj and aim
to find an operatorK (constructed from L) such that [32]
H (T [ρ])−H(ρ) ≥ 〈L〉ρ − ln〈K〉ρ (6)
holds for all states. Note that the constraints fix the
value of 〈L〉ρ as
∑
j λj lj . Such an expression arises in
the Lagrange dual of the constrained optimisation we
have described, and also bears some similarities to the
approach used in [33] to derive an entropic uncertainty
relation.
To find such a K, we first note that Jensen’s operator
inequality and the Gibbs variational principle imply [21]
H (T [ρ])−H(ρ) ≥ −〈lnT ∗T [ρ]〉ρ −H(ρ) (7)
≥ 〈L〉ρ − ln tr
(
eln(T
∗T [ρ])+L
)
, (8)
where T ∗T denotes the composition of T with its adjoint
channel T ∗. Applying a recently discovered generalisa-
tion of the Golden-Thompson inequality [34] to the trace
term in Eq. (8), it follows [21] that for any self-adjoint
operators Xk such that L =
∑
kXk, we can choose
K = T ∗T
∫
R
dt β0(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∏
k
e
1+it
2 Xk
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 , (9)
where β0(t) = (pi/2)(cosh(pit) + 1)−1. This approach
hence yields a family of lower bounds on H (T [ρ])−H(ρ),
parametrised by the choices of λj and Xk (as well as the
ordering of the operator product).
4Our task is now reduced to finding upper bounds on
〈K〉ρ. Such bounds can be found by either measuring
〈K〉ρ directly, if possible, or by bounding the maximum
value of 〈K〉ρ subject to the constraints 〈Lj〉ρ = lj . If ex-
plicit representations of K and Lj as matrices are known,
as is the case in a DD scenario, the latter is simply an
SDP in standard form. The resulting bound is then very
similar to that derived in [13], except that we have used
the generalized Golden-Thompson inequality instead of
the standard one. It is, however, unlikely to outperform
the bounds in [14, 15], which were constructed to be es-
sentially tight.
For sDI and DI scenarios, we do not know the explicit
forms of Lj and therefore K, since the measurements
are not fully characterized. To handle this, we choose
Xxy =
∑
abj λjc
(j)
abxyPa|x⊗Pb|y and obtain the main result
in our toolbox:
Theorem 1. For a DI scenario as described, the mini-
mum value of H(A0|E) (in base e), subject to constraints
〈Lj〉ρAB = lj with Lj =
∑
abxy c
(j)
abxyPa|x ⊗Pb|y, is lower-
bounded by
sup
~λ
∑
j
λj lj − ln
 sup
ρAB ,Pa|x,Pb|y
s.t. 〈Lj〉ρAB=lj
〈K〉ρAB

 , (10)
where
K = T
∫
R
dt β0(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∏
xy
∑
ab
eκabxyPa|x ⊗ Pb|y
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 , (11)
with T [σAB ] =
∑
a(Pa|0 ⊗ IB)σAB(Pa|0 ⊗ IB), β0(t) =
(pi/2)(cosh(pit)+1)−1, and κabxy = (1+it)
∑
j λjc
(j)
abxy/2.
The key observation that lets us use Theorem 1 to
compute reliable bounds is that K is now a noncom-
mutative polynomial in the measurement operators (the
integrals can be evaluated in closed form). Therefore,
the task of maximizing 〈K〉ρ over all states and mea-
surements satisfying 〈Lj〉ρ = lj can be tackled using the
family of SDPs known as the NPA hierarchy [16], which
yields a sequence of increasingly tight upper bounds on
this value. For sDI scenarios, we can impose additional
algebraic constraints corresponding to those satisfied by
the characterized measurements. We note that since the
optimization over ~λ is a supremum, any value of ~λ yields
a reliable lower bound on H(A0|E), without needing to
solve for the optimal ~λ.
APPLICATIONS
We now apply our method to two commonly studied DI
scenarios, in which Alice and Bob each perform param-
eter estimation on 2 binary-outcome measurements [35].
FIG. 4. sDI six-state protocol: We apply our method to
obtain a lower bound on H(A0|E) for an sDI version of the
six-state protocol [40]. Interestingly, the bound we obtain co-
incides with that for the BB84 protocol. For reference, we also
show the bound that could be obtained from a tomographi-
cally complete characterisation of the state, such as via the
measurements in the standard (device-dependent) six-state
protocol.
(See [21] for our results in some other scenarios, in-
cluding distributions optimised for tilted CHSH inequal-
ities [36].) The first scenario [1] corresponds to per-
forming the ideal CHSH measurements on the Werner
state (1 − 2q)|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| + (q/2)I, parametrised by a
depolarising-noise value q ∈ [0, 1/2]. The second sce-
nario is a limited-detector-efficiency model parametrised
by η ∈ [0, 1], where for every measurement the outcome 1
is flipped to 0 with probability 1− η. This is a simplistic
model for a photonic setup where failure to detect a pho-
ton is mapped to the outcome 0. For this scenario, we use
a different set of states and measurements for each value
of η, chosen to maximize the CHSH value as described
in [37].
The best known bound on H(A0|E) in these two sce-
narios [38] is that derived in [1], which uses only the
CHSH value. To make use of the full output distri-
bution instead, the only general approach previously
known [17, 18] was to first bound the guessing proba-
bility Pg(A0|E), then apply the inequality H(A0|E) ≥
− lnPg(A0|E). We note that if the marginal distribu-
tion of A0 is uniform and binary-valued, then in fact
the tighter inequality H(A0|E) ≥ (2 ln 2)(1− Pg(A0|E))
holds [39], and we use this bound in Fig. 5. How-
ever, Pg(A0|E)-based approaches do not outperform the
bound in [1] for the two scenarios considered here.
Our method uses the full output distribution to bound
H(A0|E) directly. As shown in Fig. 5, we find that it
gives results that are close to or slightly outperform the
bound from [1]. Roughly speaking, our approach tends
to perform well for moderate noise values, which is use-
ful since many Bell-test implementations are currently in
such noise regimes [41–45]. Our results confirm that for
the limited-detector-efficiency scenario, better bounds on
5FIG. 5. 2-input 2-output DI protocols: Lower bounds on H(A0|E) (in base 2) as a function of depolarising noise (for the
scenario studied in [1]) or detector efficiency (for the scenario studied in [37]). Our approach yields bounds close to or slightly
better than the best known result [1] for these scenarios, which was based on the CHSH value alone. For comparison, we also
show the indirect bound based on Pg(A0|E).
H(A0|E) can be obtained by considering the full distri-
bution rather than just the CHSH value.
We also analyze an sDI version of the six-state pro-
tocol [40] where Bob’s measurement device is unchar-
acterized. As mentioned earlier, the characterization of
Alice’s device translates to additional constraints in our
SDP. More precisely, we use the algebraic structures of
Ax to formulate additional linear constraints on top of
the NPA hierarchy. As shown in Fig. 4, the resulting
bound coincides with the bound for the BB84 protocol.
This supports a conjecture [46] that when Bob’s mea-
surements are uncharacterized, performing three mea-
surements does not offer any additional advantage over
performing only two measurements.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In summary, we have devised a method to obtain re-
liable secret key rates for QKD with untrusted devices.
The advantage of our method as compared to the ap-
proach in [1] is that in principle, it can be applied to
arbitrary DI-QKD scenarios, not only those based on spe-
cialized Bell inequalities. To the best of our knowledge,
the only existing approach that can be applied with such
generality is based on bounding the guessing probabil-
ity Pg(A0|E) instead [17, 18], which then yields indirect
bounds on H(A0|E). Our method manages to outper-
form both of these approaches in some cases, as shown in
Fig. 5. Importantly, it gives good results in regimes with
substantial noise, which are likely to be experimentally
relevant.
Currently, our method scales rapidly in computational
difficulty as the number of inputs or outputs for the
protocol increases—the operator polynomial in Eq. (11)
is generally of high order, which necessitates the use of
a high level of the NPA hierarchy [16] in order to bound
〈K〉ρ. Because of this, we currently do not have good
bounds for DI scenarios with large numbers of inputs or
outputs (though we find suboptimal bounds for some
such cases in [21]). A particularly significant family of
3-output scenarios to analyse would be photonic setups
where a no-detection event is not absorbed into either
a 0 or 1 outcome, but is instead labelled separately.
An important goal now would hence be to find ways to
improve the tractability of our approach, perhaps by
following reductions along the lines of those described
in [47]. This would enable the computation of key rates
for DI-QKD protocols with more measurement settings
and/or outcomes, and at the same time, yield good
bounds on the secret key rate in the noise regime that is
representative of present experimental conditions.
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